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337 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND TWO TYPES 
OF AUTONOMY 
Steven H. Shiffrin* 
For several decades, I have maintained that social reality is 
too complex to hope or expect that First Amendment theory 
could be reduced to a single value or a small set of values.1 
Nonetheless, extraordinarily fruitful scholarship can be 
produced by those who try. Such scholarship can show just how 
far we can get by resort to monistic approaches (as well as their 
limits). C. Edwin Baker and Seana Valentine Shiffrin offer two 
approaches to autonomy. Baker’s approach rests on a speaker 
liberty theory that he put forward over a period of decades. It is, 
for my money, the best that has been put forward in the field, 
eclipsing those of Rawls and Dworkin, for example. It represents 
in my view the most thoughtful defense of the ACLU position 
on freedom of speech.2 
Shiffrin puts forward a substantial and original contribution 
to the literature. She—wisely in my view—does not seek to offer 
a comprehensive theory. But she maintains that if we focus on 
humans as thinkers instead of as speakers or audience members, 
 
 *  Charles Frank Reavis, Sr., Professor of Law, Cornell University. 
 1. See, e.g., STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND 
ROMANCE ch. 1 (1990); Steven H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic 
Regulation: Away From a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 
1212 (1983); Steven H. Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment 
Methodology, 25 UCLA L. REV. 915 (1978). Similarly, in Steven Shiffrin, Dissent, 
Political Participation, and First Amendment Methodology, 97 VA. L. REV. 559 (2011), I 
argue that political participation will not serve as an organizing principle for First 
Amendment doctrine or as a primary normative basis for First Amendment theory. 
I have argued that if the First Amendment is to have a center it should be protecting 
and encouraging the practice of dissent. In addition to the Democracy and Romance 
book supra, see STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE AND THE MEANINGS OF 
AMERICA (1999). Although I think protecting and encouraging the practice of dissent is 
vital (primarily because of its role in combating unjust power relations), I do not think 
dissent is valuable per se (its value depends on the First Amendment values it implicates 
in particular contexts and the harm the government seeks to mitigate caused by dissent). 
Indeed, I think that the presence of dissent is neither a necessary, nor a sufficient basis 
for protection. 
 2. I expand on this in a memorial essay on Ed’s life and work. Steven Shiffrin, Ed 
Baker: Friend and First Amendment Scholar, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 963 (2010). 
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we can provide surprising insights across a range of First 
Amendment issues. One might have thought that the First 
Amendment literature would have explored in detail the 
implications of freedom of thought, but it has not, and Shiffrin 
systematically forges a new path. 
Baker argues that the legitimacy of government demands 
respect for formal autonomy. He apparently maintains that 
instrumental reasons need play no role in speech clause analysis 
(though they do in press clause analysis).3 The crucial question 
for Baker is whether a speaker has coerced or manipulated 
another. If so, the speech is not protected. If not, the speech is 
protected. 4 Thus, he says that obscenity is an easy case for his 
system. Obscenity does not coerce or manipulate, and, therefore, 
it is protected.5 Note that Baker’s system dictates this conclusion 
wholly apart from the consequences of obscene speech. The 
same would be true of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, fighting words, the revealing of intimate facts about a 
person’s private life, negligent defamation of private persons (at 
least in the non-media context), and racist speech including the 
advocacy of genocide (so long as it did not amount to an 
attempt). It may be that there are good grounds to protect all the 
speech in these categories (I doubt it), but resolving these 
problems via moral geometry without attention to the 
consequences does not seem right to me. Blanket protection for 
formal autonomy seems insufficiently respectful of the dignity of 
human beings as witnessed by its protection of the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, fighting words, the revealing of 
private facts about a person’s private life, and some negligent 
(indeed, even grossly negligent) defamation of character. In 
 
 3. Although his liberty theory made instrumental arguments unnecessary to 
ground freedom of speech, he also thought that instrumental arguments supported his 
conclusions as well. 
 4. I leave to the side Baker’s distinction between substantively valued and 
instrumentally valued speech because it is not important for my criticisms.  
 5. Actually, since obscenity is ordinarily accomplished by means of what Baker 
would classify as the press, he has imported some of his free speech conclusions into the 
press clause. In the balance of my analysis, I will assume he does the same in other areas 
including the revealing of private facts about a person’s private life and defamation. In 
prior work, for example, he says that defamation law should arrive at the same answers 
whether the defendant is a private individual or the press. C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN 
LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 242 (1989). Particularly because attention to 
consequences is required in the press context under his analysis, I do not think he was 
bound to arrive at the same results in speech and press cases. The only area, however, 
where I know that he arrived at somewhat different results between speech and press was 
in the copyright arena. 
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addition, suppose that pornography6 and racist speech create 
unjust conditions for women and people of color. In the absence 
of good consequentialist arguments against such prohibitions,7 it 
is a little odd to be told that injustice must be maintained in 
order to protect the legitimacy of the government. In the case of 
racist speech and pornography, the effect of Baker’s system is 
automatically to privilege negative liberty over the positive 
liberty that might be created by governmental egalitarian 
measures. To put it another way, using Baker’s terminology, I 
believe that it is sometimes appropriate to privilege substantive 
autonomy over formal autonomy even when the exercise of 
formal autonomy has not interfered with the equal formal 
autonomy of another. Doing so, in my view, can make the 
government more legitimate.8 
The exercise of the formal autonomy of speech can fit into 
the problematic categories of speech mentioned above or it can 
produce uncontroversially protected political, religious, artistic, 
scientific, or private communications. As I understand him, 
Baker maintains that interfering with racist speech is no better 
or worse than interfering with religious or political speech (at 
least from a formal perspective—obviously Baker was no fan of 
racist speech). Nonetheless, there are grounds to be suspicious of 
a theory that equates these categories of speech without need of 
further investigation. From Baker’s perspective, to interfere with 
formal autonomy (when the person has not interfered with the 
autonomy of another) is to disrespect the speaker. To deny such 
autonomy is to give up on any legitimate basis for justifying the 
use of force against an individual. 
I deny that interference with formal autonomy in the 
circumstances I mentioned earlier disrespects the speaker. The 
government can have great respect for the speaker as a citizen, 
but it can disrespect the choices made by the speaker precisely 
because the speech causes harm that outweighs the value of the 
 
 6. Following MacKinnon, I would distinguish pornography from obscenity, but the 
distinction is not important in this context. 
 7. In the past, I have argued that there are good consequentialist arguments 
against prohibiting racist speech in the United States, but not against prohibiting some 
forms of pornography. I doubt I was right about racist speech and suspect that the case 
for pornography regulations was not as strong as I thought. I continue, however, to think 
the case for the latter is strong enough to justify regulation. 
 8. For reasons I have developed elsewhere, I actually do not think it is possible to 
have a government in a large-scale society that is legitimated for all citizens. It is always 
possible, however, to move toward a better and more legitimate government. See 
SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA, supra note 1, at 91–
93. 
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speech.9 There is another way to put this: I am in Mill’s family; 
Baker is in Kant’s family by way of Habermas. Baker 
complained that the harm principle is fuzzy, undefined, and 
capable of manipulation. It is. Indeed, Baker argued that the 
harm principle inherently requires difficult substantive 
judgments about the character of harm, the extent of harm 
required for abridgment, the particular types of autonomy that 
need to be respected and those that do not, and ultimately 
assessments of what it takes for human beings to flourish. Baker 
argued that his commitment to formal autonomy leaves many 
fewer grey areas and offers a defining path in a difficult area. It 
does. I do not think his path leads us off a cliff, but I do think it 
leads to many unfortunate results and could potentially lead to 
injustice. 
Finally, I deny that interference with formal autonomy in 
the circumstances I have outlined makes a government 
illegitimate. If the facts warranted intervention in the context of 
racist speech, I would rather explain to the racist why his moral 
theory is defective and why the state need not respect it than try 
to explain to people of color that they must live in unjust 
conditions. Similarly, if a person intentionally inflicts emotional 
distress upon another, I would rather explain to the tortfeasor 
why her conduct was reprehensible than explain to the victim 
that we are obligated not to violate the formal autonomy of the 
tortfeasor.10 
I think the position I have taken applies to all those who try 
to develop a comprehensive theory of free speech autonomy 
within a Kantian or neo-Kantian framework. Kant thought that 
“freedom” (a term of art) could not be restricted unless it 
interfered with the freedom of another; with limited exceptions, 
Dworkin argued that the right of freedom of speech could be 
interfered with only if it interfered with another’s right; Rawls 
argued that the basic liberty of freedom of speech could be 
abridged only if it interfered with another basic liberty; and 
Baker argues that the autonomy of freedom of speech can be 
 
 9. Applying a harm test requires a contestable conception of human anthropology 
or of what it means for human beings to flourish. Baker was not opposed for government 
to act on such conceptions, but he did not think such conceptions should play a role in 
restricting liberty. 
 10. I do not think it is possible to have a legitimate government in any large-scale 
“democracy” (let alone in our corpocracy) because of the inevitable corruption present 
in large-scale bureaucracies and hierarchies, but governments can improve their claims to 
legitimacy (they can be less injust), so I am not bothered by the large role that legitimacy 
played in grounding Baker’s system. 
!!SHIFFRINSTEVE-272-FREEDOMOFSPEECHANDTWOTYPESOFAUTONOMY3.DOC  10/17/2011  9:22 AM 
2011] TWO TYPES OF AUTONOMY 341 
 
interfered with only if it coerces (or manipulates) and thus 
interferes with the autonomy of another. Although the formal 
structure of the argument is the same, their results differ. Kant 
said that freedom included reputation (conceived as a property 
right) and was in favor of imposing liability for defaming the 
dead. Rawls did not list reputation in his scheme of basic 
liberties. Out of thin air, Dworkin discovered a “right” not to be 
negligently defamed. To the extent Baker supports an action for 
defamation, it arises from manipulative speech. But the 
defamed’s autonomy is not interfered with by that speech. The 
defamed is a third party. To my mind stretching the system to 
arrive at sensible results is appropriate. But I think some 
stretching is necessary even to deal with defamatory lies.11 
I would conclude this aspect of the analysis to note that 
Baker rarely stretches. He applies his system with integrity. He 
shows that the autonomy justification will not apply to business 
corporations or to media corporations. He rightly argues that 
those who argue from speaker autonomy must employ different 
principles to have a theory of the press. As I mentioned earlier, I 
think he does the best job of showing where formal speaker 
autonomy leads, but I believe it inherently leads us away from 
satisfactory results in too many contexts to serve as a 
comprehensive theory of freedom of speech. Imperfect as it is, I 
believe that balancing can lead us to more satisfactory results. 
Although I do not think that “the individual agent’s interest 
in the protection of the free development and operation of her 
mind”12 is central to the First Amendment, I do think that Seana 
Shiffrin is right to argue that such an interest is of special 
importance and leads us to significant insights. I think that her 
exploration of the interests that every individual, rational, 
human agent qua thinker possesses is genuinely illuminating; 
that her claim of the special importance of speech to human 
beings as thinkers is original and unassailable, and I agree with 
her conclusion (well tied to freedom of thought) that dissent, 
religious speech, fiction, art, music, diaries, personal 
 
 11. Baker’s theory would seem to authorize non-protection for all lies. But I doubt 
he would have allowed juries, judge, or administrative agencies to impose sanctions for 
any and all utterances that they deemed to be lies. The alternative would be to authorize 
the imposition of sanctions only if there is some further harm. But this opens Baker to 
the kind of subjectivity he has sought to avoid and for which he has criticized Mill. In 
fairness, however, this problem is limited to a narrow category of already problematic 
speech. 
 12. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech¸ 27 
CONST. COMMENT. 283, 298 (2011). 
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conversations and letters deserve strong protection under the 
First Amendment. I also think that her perspective yields 
important light on the much discussed subject of compelled 
speech in West Virginia v. Barnette13 and on the muddled 
doctrine of freedom of association. 
I would like to sketch, however, a few areas where I think 
or know that we differ or wonder if we do. Although I share the 
view that many types of speech must be protected to safeguard 
the role of thinkers, and I understand the conclusion that from 
thinkers’ perspectives, no hierarchy among these forms of 
speech appears to be appropriate, I believe, as I think she does, 
that the thinker’s perspective should not be the exclusive 
perspective. If that perspective is not exclusive, then there is 
room to argue for various hierarchies. I have argued, for 
example, that the role of speech in combating injustice in public 
and private contexts is especially important. From this 
perspective, it is particularly important to protect dissent. Of 
course, she could agree with this and think no hierarchy is 
necessary, but that conclusion would flow from something more 
than a thinker’s perspective. 
Second, I think that the thinker’s perspective could 
potentially protect too much speech. I have in mind commercial 
speech or the speech of non-press business corporations. For 
Baker the issue was relatively easy. Commercial and corporate 
speech are dictated by the market14 and, therefore is not an 
exercise of speaker liberty. For Baker, listeners have no 
“affirmative constitutional right to override a restriction” on 
commercial or corporate speech. Shiffrin argues that commercial 
and corporate speech should receive lesser protection, but the 
thinker’s perspective may not provide a sturdy enough 
explanation for this conclusion. I can see how a thinker’s 
perspective can provide an argument with respect to corporate 
political speech. To the extent corporate political speech is 
 
 13. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) 
 14. Shiffrin rightly argues that Baker’s claim that commercial and corporate speech 
are dictated by the market is overbroad in cases of market failure or in cases where 
organic farmers, for example, revolt against the reigning commercial values in the 
market. The problem of market failure was acute for Baker’s theory in its early years 
when oligopolies were relatively free from market pressure (see Shiffrin, The First 
Amendment and Economic Regulation, supra note 1), but the market has significantly 
changed since in a more competitive direction. ROBERT B. REICH, SUPERCAPITALISM 
(2007). On the other hand, Baker acknowledged the force of Shiffrin’s criticism regarding 
dissenting advertisers such as organic farmers and agreed that they should be afforded 
protection. C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 IND. L.J. 
981, 995–97 (2009). 
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unrelated to the authentically held views of the speaker, it can 
reasonably be argued that the listener loses little by having the 
cluttered marketplace15 cleared of such speech.16 Purely from a 
thinker’s perspective, however, I would think at least 
informational advertising should be protected. Informational 
advertising may be dictated by the market, but the market itself 
reflects preferences of people who may well want information 
about travel, electronic devices, and drug prices. To be sure, 
many of those preferences are created by advertising, but many 
are not, and those that are so created are still the product of 
thought. 
I am also interested in Shiffrin’s views about image 
advertising. On the one hand, as I read her, she places 
importance on the presence of rational agents, but she does not 
believe that “emotional” speech should be beneath First 
Amendment protection. Some believe that many of our greatest 
artists are employed by corporations and that advertisements are 
well designed to provoke aesthetic reactions. I, however, would 
be sympathetic to an argument that image advertising in our 
culture is a special form of manipulation that should not be 
protected. I think a thinker perspective could underwrite that 
argument though it would need to distinguish imagistic political 
advertising. In the end, despite having claimed many years ago 
that commercial advertising should receive a degree of free 
speech protection, I now regret it given the sweeping protection 
provided for such advertising made by the Court (upholding 
tobacco advertising for me was the last straw). A thinker 
perspective and a liberty perspective (the two overlap) can 
provide part of the justification for putting commercial and 
corporate speech outside the protection of the First 
Amendment, but the addition of other perspectives (e.g., 
democracy and dissent perspectives) can strengthen the case. 
Third, Shiffrin thinks that her mentioned categories of 
speech should be foundational and subject to strong and 
principled protection. As she puts it, she has only offered a 
sketch of her views (which was quite enough work), but I am left 
 
 15. Although Shiffrin focuses on the thinker (including speakers and listeners), she 
need not accept the marketplace arguments put forth by Holmes. 
 16. This is particularly true when the speech promotes corruption of the democratic 
process. On the other hand, constitutional considerations should not be considered 
absent. For example, it would be deeply problematic if corporations were authorized to 
sponsor Republicans, but not Democrats or vice versa. On this analysis, corporations 
should get some form of political equality protection, but not liberty protection. 
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wondering about the meaning of foundational and principled, 
especially the latter. Leaving aside the focus on different kinds 
of autonomy, I am wondering how much the commitment to 
principle might put her in the Kant/Rawls/Dworkin/Baker camp. 
Fourth, I think Shiffrin is entirely correct in arguing that a 
thinker perspective lays bare a major problem with the 
compelled speech regulation at issue in Barnette. She maintains 
that it is simply illicit for the government to use manipulative 
methods bypassing deliberative faculties in order to influence 
the child.17 I agree with this, but I would add that I think 
compelled speech should be unconstitutional even if it were not 
calculated to influence the speaker. As Laurence Tribe 
maintains, there is something deeply wrong with forcing 
someone like the school child in Barnette or the driver in 
Wooley18 to be a forced courier of,19 or megaphone for, a 
government message.20 In my view, it is not just (as Baker might 
have it) that formal autonomy is breached, compelled speech 
simply does not appropriately respect the speaker’s human 
dignity whether the speaker or audience is influenced or not. 
Finally, I think Shiffrin is entirely right to observe that 
associations are not just sites for amplifying voices, but that they 
are also sites for forming values and thus particularly important 
from the thinker’s perspective. Exposing the narrowness of prior 
law on association is a substantial contribution of the thinker’s 
perspective. I think it is worth observing, however, that these 
instrumental perspectives on associations do not exhaust 
associational values. I have in mind intimate associations, 
particularly friendships. Friendship involves substantial concern 
for the good of the friend and a readiness to act in ways that 
further that good.21 As Lawrence Blum argues, “Friendship is an 
altruistic phenomenon . . . ; a relationship based on mutual ad-
vantage (even if it involved mutual liking) would not in this 
 
 17. Image advertising also seeks to bypass deliberative faculties, but so does much 
political advertising. The compelled speech in Barnette is distinguishable. Nonetheless, 
even if I were inclined to protect commercial advertising and the speech of non-press 
business corporations, I would cast the regulatory net broadly enough to permit 
government to regulate imagistic commercial advertising, but not imagistic political 
advertising. That, however, would require a long discussion. 
 18. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). It is possible, but less likely that New 
Hampshire was trying to influence the mind of the driver by putting the motto on his car 
than West Virginia was trying to influence the mind of the child. 
 19. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 901 n.15 (1978). 
 20. Laurence H. Tribe, Disentangling Symmetries: Speech, Association, Parenthood, 
28 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 641, 645 (2001). 
 21. LAWRENCE A. BLUM, FRIENDSHIP, ALTRUISM, AND MORALITY 43 (1980). 
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sense be a friendship.”22 Blum maintains that without the 
presence of altruism, trust, reliance, and substantial personal 
involvement would not be possible.23 If Blum is right, an 
important aspect of intimate association is captured neither by 
the speech amplification perspective nor by the thinker’s 
perspective. This would be a criticism only if these perspectives 
purported to be comprehensive, but I do not understand them to 
do so. I am not sure whether Blum’s understanding of friendship 
has practical or theoretical value for freedom of speech, though I 
would tend to believe that freedom of association is best 
supported by support of all of its underlying values. I suspect 
that one could develop fruitful insights about freedom of speech 
by concentrating on the full range of values that underlie 
associations. This dialogue itself has shown that insights abound 
if one starts from democratic participation, speaker autonomy, 
or the autonomy of the thinker. Because I believe free speech is 
supported by a multiplicity of values, I do not believe we have 
exhausted the theoretical richness of the free speech terrain, but 
we have covered a lot of ground and opened some new territory 
in the process. 
 
 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 44. 
